This was orginally published in Green Left Weekly here, going to print on June 24 shortly before Morsi's victory was announced. Stay posted for another update on his swearing in, the Brotherhood's withdrawal from Tahrir, and the military's advances.
[Although official results are yet to be announced, it seems] Muhammad Morsi, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood (MB) candidate, has won the second round of Egypt's presidential elections, held on June 16-17.
However, his opponent, ex-regime candidate Ahmed Shafik, also declared victory on election night, claiming there was no way Morsi had secured the million-vote lead their camp claimed.
Election Contest
In the lead-up to the second round of voting, several prominent left forces, including the Revolutionary Socialists and the April 6 Youth Movement, declared their support for Morsi's campaign.
In a statement on May 28, the Revolutionary Socialists described Shafiq as the "face of the counter-revolution", and without a candidate standing for the Tahrir revolution, called for all supporters of the January 25 revolution to unite behind Morsi.
The statement attributed Shafiq's success to "the smear campaigns, systematic repression and intimidation of the social and popular forces "
An independant election monitor supported by Middle East Voices substantiated Morsi's claim of leading with around 51.8% of the vote. (the final count was 51.7% Morsi)
Much of the attention from the elections, however, was taken up with the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF)'s maneuvers to limit the power of the winner.
Military Declares Power
After the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) ruled on June 14 that the Parliamentary Election Law regulating the 2011 elections was unconstitutional, the SCAF issued a decree dissolving the Islamist-majority parliament on June 17, shortly after the presidential polls had closed.
The day before the ruling, the Justice Ministry had also decreed that military police and intelligence officers could arrest civilians, continuing the legacy of the state of emergency, which legally ended at the start of June.
Al Jazeera English quoted Mohamed Beltagy, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, as describing the decree as a "military coup" which had not been discussed in Parliament.
On June 17, Ahram Online reported Saad El-Katatni, speaker of the Parliament, as having told the SCAF he would continue to convene the body despite its dissolution.
The SCAF has also issued a "supplementary constitutional declaration" seizing many Presidential powers for the council itself.
Armed forces were deployed in great numbers across Egypt ahead of the announcement of official results – originally scheduled for June 21.
Amr Ahmed, from the Egyptian Socialist Party, told Green Left Weekly: "There are four main points to the declaration.
Firstly, that the SCAF are the only ones responsible for everything relating to the military, the appointment of leadership, and [Field Marshall] Tantawi is to hold the power of Commander in Chief and Secretary of Defence
Second, that the SCAF must approve any declaration of a state of war.
Thirdly, the SCAF will hold the authority of Parliament until a new one can be elected.
Fourth, the SCAF will control the body to draft a new constitution within 3 months, to be approved by a referendum after that.
So at present you can see the SCAF will remain in the scene regardless of who is the president.... they will be like a marionette in the hands of the military."
Responses
The US government has signalled concerns with the situation. Hilary Clinton responded to the declarations with a statement on June 14 calling for the military authorities to "fully transfer power to a democratically elected civilian government as planned", reported Ahram Online.
However, the role of the US has been far from helpful to the transition to democratic rule in Egypt. In fact, in March Clinton waived the requirement for certification of basic human rights conditions in the country before the United States' $1.3 US billion of aid to Egypt could be released, reported the New York Times on March 26.
The Guardian reported that Egypt's benchmark index dropped 1.9% in the early hours of Monday morning, on the back of the expected win of Morsi and the military maneuvers.
Initial protests at the dissolution of parliament drew thousands to the street on June 15. Then on June 18, a joint statement was issued by a variety of left forces to "Announce [the signatories'] complete rejection of the Supplementary Constitutional Declaration."
The statement called for the president-elect to reject the Supplementary Declaration, cancel exceptional measures issued by the SCAF and refuse to take the oath of office before the SCC. (ed: Morsi did take the oath before the SCC, which I write about in my following article)
The statement called for a protest in Tahrir Square on Tuesday June 19; tens of thousands responded, rallying through the night.
The Muslim Brotherhood called for its supporters to join the protests throughout the week, launching its own vigils in public squares throughout the country against the "coup".
Ahmed told Green Left Weekly: "What's happening now has nothing to do with the goals of the revolution or the people, but is part of the ongoing conflict between the SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood for power and influence in the state."
Where to for the Revolution?
Since the first-round elections, when all candidates reflecting the demands of the revolution were defeated, Egypt's revolutionary camp has been split on how to approach the electoral processes and the political sphere.
One important chapter for breaking people's illusions in the Muslim Brotherhood is the question of sexism and sexual harrassment, which was brought to the fore in December when footage of a female protester being beaten and stripped half-naked in Tahrir by soldiers spread online.
Ahmed said: "On this issue there is no conflict between the SCAF and the MB. The Brotherhood said that it was the fault of the protester for being in Tahrir Square that this happened to her."
"The illusion of fundamental differences between the MB and the SCAF will become more and more apparent over time."
Where to for Tahrir?
The "leaderless" approach of the Tahrir revolutionaries, uniting around basic demands for democratic and economic reforms, has been a factor in the lack of significant wins in the political sphere for the demands of the revolution beyond the winning of electoral process and the trial of Mubarak.
"We have pushed to take some advancements and achievements, but they have all been taken up by the Brotherhood", Ahmed told GLW.
"We need to create a third power, an organisation of the revolution, to represent its agenda & goals, and lead people towards the revolution's milestones."
"The Egyptian Socialist Party is seeking to create this third political force with other figures on the left – such as Sabahy and El Baradei – that can represent the revolution."
Writing on her blog Tahrir & Beyond on June 17, Gigi Ibrahim, a leading member of Egypt's Revolutionary Socialists, declared: "the revolution has no machine, no organised group, no political party sufficient enough to adopt the revolution's goals and capable of fighting the two most organised and biggest threatening machines to the revolution, the NDP (Mubarak's party) and MB, and the SCAF"
Throughout the struggles around the elections, the workers' movement has continued to push for economic & political reforms in workplaces across Egypt.
Public Transport workers in Cairo went on strike for two weeks in March, demanding the removal of corrupt Mubarak-era officials as well as a bonus equal to 100 weeks pay.
On March 27 they went back to work, winning their demands for improved pay and conditions.
The strong showing of Hamdeen Sabahy, who put forward a Nasserist platform of expanding subsidies and state investment, and polled a close third behind Shafik in the first round of the presidential elections, shows that the prospects for building on the demands of workers and democracy activists in the political sphere are good.
The question is – will they find the vehicle to exercise their own power? Or will the mauevering between the SCAF & MB stagnate the January 25 revolution?
Showing posts with label Cairo. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Cairo. Show all posts
Friday, 6 July 2012
Wednesday, 20 June 2012
Egypt: Streets erupt as court dissolves parliament in 'coup'
This piece was finished shortly before polls opened in last weekend's Egyptian Presidential elections, which it now seems the Muslim Brotherhood's candidate Muhammad Morsi, who revolutionary groups such as the April 6 Youth Movement and the Revolutionary Socialists backed, has announced his victory in. Official results will be announced Thursday. Stay posted for more in-depth coverage. Originally published at Green Left Weekly.
Monday, June 18, 2012
Egypt's second-round presidential elections between ex-regime figure Ahmed Shafiq and Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohamed Morsi will go ahead after the High Constitutional Court (HCC) ruled on June 14 that Shafiq's candidacy was constitutional.
The ruling declared that the Political Disenfanchisement Law, which barred ex-members of Mubarak's National Democratic Party (NDP) from holding high government offices, was unconstitional.
In what came as a shock to many, the HCC also said Egypt's Parliamentary Elections Law, which had regulated last year's parliamentary elections, was unconstitutional, dissolving the lower house People's Assembly.
The elections last year brought the Muslim Brotherhood to the fore and, combined with the Salafist al-Nour party, gave the Islamists a majority. Morsi, the Brotherhood's candidate in the presidential elections, led the first round of voting over May 23-24.
But Ziad Bahaa-Eldin, a legislator from the Social Democratic Party, said Egypt's electoral law was "flawed and brought in a flawed parliament," Reuters reported on June 15.
"Parliament had lost much of its stature and credibility ... because of the Islamist parties' misuse of the majority they enjoyed."
But many activists have called the moves a "coup". Enjy Hamdy, from the leading activist organisation the April 6 Youth Movement (A6YM), said: "This all must be seen as a military coup, an attempt by the army to stay in power longer to protect their interests, which we will not accept."
First-round candidate Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh also called the results "an obvious military coup", reported Bikya Masr.
The Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), who have retained presidential powers since Mubarak was ousted on February 11 last year, has blamed ongoing protests and struggles for democratic reform on "foreign hands", while refusing popular calls to relinquish their authority to a civilian "salvation council" to oversee Egypt's elections.
Ahram Online reporter Wael Eskaner tweeted in response to the ruling: "It's not true that Egyptians aren't ready for democracy, it's the Egyptian regime that isn't."
Angry protests were launched around the country after the results. Two thousand protesters marched from Mohandeseen to Tahrir Square in Cairo on June 15 in a protest called by the Revolutionary Socialists, A6YM and others, Ahram Online said.
However, despite thousands taking to Tahrir Square, street protests did not reach the critical mass needed to shut down the city.
Ahram Online's reporter said marchers tore down and defaced campaign posters for Shafiq. Immediately after the results images becan circulating social media of protesters stamping on Shafiq's posters or hitting them with shoes.
Despite the protests, the presidential run-off was set to go ahead at the weekend of June 16-17.
Friday, 1 June 2012
"An act of political thuggery, not a matter of law and order" - Interview with Austin Mackell
Austin Mackell (of The Moon Under Water) is an Australian
journalist based in Cairo who reports on Egyptian politics, the
labour movement and life on the street. In February he was arrested
in the city of Mahalla el-Kubra while reported on an attempted
general strike of workers. I spoke to Austin on the 30th of May; this interview will appear in Green Left Weekly.
What are the latest developments
with the Presidential elections – what do the first round results
show, and is it clear who will be contesting the second round?
The first round of the elections show
that the Muslim Brotherhood and the remnants of the old regime, the
felool, are still able to out-compete the revolutionaries in terms of
an electoral process.
The winner by a small margin was the
Muslim Brotherhood's candidate, Mohamed Morsi, and second was Ahmed
Shafik, who was Prime Minister under Mubarak appointed at the very
last minute of his regime's life. It looks now like the final race
will be between those two candidates, which is a huge disappointment
for the revolutionaries.
There was a left-wing secular candidate
called Hamdi Sabahi, who was written off by many people as an outside
because he didn't have the resources and infrastructure many of the
other candidates had – he came in third. Considering that he was
also competing for the vote with Abul Fotouh, an Islamist who had
split from the Brotherhood towards the moderate side who was also
considered a revolutionary candidate – those two between them, if
they'd had a combined revolutionary vote they would have had a clear
lead.
Of course many of the revolutionaries
boycotted the first round. I wonder if they are questioning that
seeing how close Sabahi came to winning it.
Secondly, now there's a much stronger
call for a boycott as well, since it's the Muslim Brotherhood versus
the old regime. There's been some controvery over some
revolutionaries saying to back the Muslim brotherhood because at
least they aren't from the old dictatorship, while others are saying
no, they already have control of the parliament, handing them control
of the presidency as well would be handing over too much control at
the formative stage. In any case, most revolutionaries, in terms
of people who have been active on the streets, are still saying
the street is where the battle has to happen for the next few years –
that's the position of the April 6 youth movement. That's why they
didn't contest the elections, they say that you don't have elections
during a revolutionary phase, the revolution has to be more complete.
Who is exactly is Hamdi Sabahi? What
does he stand for?
Sabahi is the founder of the Dignity
party; he was an MP under President Mubarak, he won a seat in 2005,
though he's credited as being one of the few voices of resistance in
that parliament asides from the Brotherhood. He really ran as the
poor man's candidate. His party is Nasserist; carrying on the spirit
of pan-arab socialism would be his root ideology, although it's
moderated and the message is much more populist and nasserist than
ideological
How widely was the boycott observed?
It's hard to know how widely it was
observed; it's clear that the turnout was lower than the
parliamentary election, which some revolutionaries have called a
victory because it means the population is losing faith in SCAF's
electoral process. But you could also make the argument that that was
simply the result of the Salafi candidate Abbou Ismael being
disqualified ahead of the poll. Because the Salafists didn't have a
candidate to vote for – some voted for Abol Fotouh, or for Morsi,
but you can imagine a lot of them were a lot less motivated to vote
not having a major Salafi candidate on the ballot. This would also
explain why there was what's been considered a majority secular vote,
if you add up Sabahi, Shafik and Amr Moussa, the former foreign
minister, which people have been using to say Egyptians have turned
to secular candidates. But you can question that because the Salafis
may have been sitting out as well.
That has probably been a bigger boycott
(although it may not have been phrased that way) than the active
calls for a boycott from Tahrir Square and the revolutionary youth
networks around it. However, that being said, now that it's a race
between Morsi and Shafik you might see a much bigger boycott in the
second round.
What is the situation with Tahrir
Square and the revolutionary layer? Is the Square still occupied?
There's basically a constant occupation
now in Tahrir Square with people protesting – earlier today they
had at least a few hundred there protesting due to allegations of
fraud by Shafik. In fact, there's been reports of fraud by both
Shafik and Moussa as well as the Brotherhood by April 6 and various
news outlets as well. But the general impression is that there was a
lot of small irregularities but not necessarily enough to have
influenced the vote. It doesn't mean there was a concerted plan to
rig the campaigns, but perhaps just the kind of dirty campaigning you
see everywhere.
Some people are protesting of that –
a lot of them, Sabahi's supporters – but the Square's been pretty
much permanently occupied since the clashes of the Occupy Cabinet
incident in early December. All throughout 2011 there was an ongoing
struggle for physical control of the Square, and now it seems the
army and the police have pretty much given up on it. The protesters
were allowed to keep the central island with tents, as well as the
space in front of the central administrative building the Mogamma.
So the revolutionary youth won that
space in those clashes, and actually now we've seen the latest
clashes taking place outside the ministry of defence, which occured
just before the elections. There were numbers of Salafis
demonstrating because their candidate Abbou Ismael had been
disqualified, actually on the basis that his mother was an American
citizen – which some were disputing, claiming there's a conspiracy
against him, etc etc.
Either way his supporters went down to
protest the decision at the electoral commission, and they were
joined by secular supporters and opponents of the SCAF as well; there
were 11 deaths reported there, in the final week before the election.
There is still definitely real tension on the streets and the
possibility of more of these battles – particularly if Shafik wins, I might add.
I should add that the significance of
protest moving to the MOD is that the protesters are moving more into
more confrontation – we've got Tahrir now and that's great, now
let's move on the next seat of power, seems to be the idea.
Is the Brotherhood taking out the
presidential election likely to change the balance of power or weaken
SCAF's hold over the country?
That's very difficult to know – it's
certainly going to change the balance of power. What the relationship
between the brotherhood and the military will be like and how it'll
evolve is really difficult to know. People are talking about some
kind of deal being made between the Brotherhood and the SCAF –
there's probably been all kinds of deals made, but I don't think that
there's a marriage between the two about to take place where we see
them unite as the stable new elite, although something like that may
evolve. Really we're in a period when making predictions is a good
way to look stupid; if you look at the polling during the last
election votes fluctuated wildly in the days before the elections.
Things are really in flux here, there aren't established political
forces like we're used to dealing with in Australia. There is the
brotherhood and there is the military but there's this huge chaotic
force at work in the political sphere as well of the revolution.
How has the labour movement related
to the elections?
The one thing that was clear after the
parliamentary elections was that until now the labour movement as a
whole hadn't emerged on scene as any sort of political force. But
with the emergence of Sabahi as such a strong candidate, there's
certainly evidence that this is on the cards in the future. This was
a suprise to many here, including people like me with an interest in
the labour movement, as we didn't see anything like this gaining
support in the parliamentary elections – but there's clearly an
affinity for labour in Sabahi's platform, in what he's standing for.
We don't know how real that would be if he got into power, of course.
His candidacy underlines the new dynamics which are starting to
emerge – there are the candidates like Moussa and Shafik, whose
primary qualifications are having served in the old regime, and whose
popularity has its own reasons like name recognition – but if you
remove them from the equation you have the Muslim Brotherhood and
Islamic conservatism on the right and then Arab nationalism on the
left, and then you have a candidate like Abol Fotouh in the middle
who is some kind of mix of all of those. So this is a political
spectrum very similar to ours – although with such population and
poverty in Egypt there's a lot more space for leftward movement,
which is exciting.
Did any radical left forces make a
decent showing in the results?
That depends how you define "radical"
– there was Khaled Ali, who was seen as the revolution's candidate.
How radical his rhetoric exactly would be I'm not clear on – I
haven't seen many of his speeches translated – but my impression is
he's been seen as the candidate of the revolutionary youth, so
radical in that sence, although certainly not as far to the left as
the Revolutionary Socialists, who didn't field a candidate, and who
now have gained a lot of ire for their leadership figures suggesting
Morsi should be backed to prevent the return of old leadership.
But the candidate on the left of note
was Sabahi – and his platform was significantly to the left. The
difference between Sabahi and Shafik or Moussa was much bigger than
the difference between major left and right candidates in any western
elections, so the revolutionary situation has already opened up more
democratic space than we already have in the west. His platform was
explicitly about wealth redistribution; instead of following the line
being tossed around by the IMF for cutting or "targetting"
subsidies, he's talking about the need to expand subsidies and
providing more services. His success has come as a surprise, and it
changes the political landscape. Of course the success of Shafik and
Morsi were also suprises and much more unpleasant ones.
What is the latest with your case?
Has the regime indicated if they are going to press the charges?
We're still not clear whether we'll be
taken to court or not; what we've got are preliminary charges – the
Egyptian legal system is modelled on the French, so it doesn't really
mirror Australia's. The charges are with the prosecutor's office, who
is then meant to decide whether it goes to court or the case is
archived. That's been the case for the last 3 months, and there
hasn't been any real progress – we've heard of paper moving from
one office to another, so we don't know when to expect any
resolution.
Are you free to travel and report?
To an extent – my passport was taken
when I was arrested, and it's being held along with my laptop and
camera and other stuff, so it makes it quite difficult to move
around. In the initial period after my arrest I was quite nervous
when moving around of being recognised in the street as the spy from
TV; I was kicked out my apartment and my neighbourhood has sort-of
turned against me after our story was flashed on state TV. It's
already been made quite difficult for journalists in general, foreign
journalists in particular, by virtue of all of the media about
foreign conspirators and such. And if I were in the situation where I
had to explain myself to a large group of people why I don't have my
passport, what I'm doing, etc etc – it's a situation which might
complicate things with the case. But the main thing is that I'm not
allowed to leave the country while this is going on – I can't
travel home to Australia or anywhere else, which is an inconvenience.
But there's a veiled threat in all of this; we're very confident we
would win if the case went to court, but however improbable it is,
this notion of 5 to 7 years sentence is in the back of your mind; it
makes it hard to live a normal life, let alone work or move around.
What do you have to say to Bob Carr
and the Australian government?
I wish Bob Carr would take a more
active interest in the case. He's been very standoffish and hasn't
responded to any of my friends, family or supporters – even through
the union, I was only able to get what looked like a form letter our
of him saying they can't interfere with the Egyptian legal process.
On the other hand, the motion introduced by Greens Senator Lee
Rhiannon to the Senate was passed calling on the Australian
government to ensure due process was followed. I don't know how much
information Bob Carr has about the case; you at Green Left probably
are quite aware that what is happening is anything but due process.
From the beginning this is an act of political thuggery, not a matter
of law an order. The Australian government should have the gonads to
speak out on that, as it should have for all of the human rights
abuses committed by the Egyptian forces and all of the remnants of
the old regime. But there's a silence on that, as there is on so many
other issues, because Washington says to be quiet about it, so we do.
My case is nothing compared to what
happened to people like David Hicks or Mamdouh Habib. Habib was
brought to Egypt – he didn't come here of his own free will but was
"rendered" or kidnapped here, and tortured for 6 months. He
has alleged the Australian government was complicit in that, and they
certainly still haven't cleared their name of that. You can see that
today with the case of Julian Assange, or with our case here – the
government certainly doesn't hold the rights of it's citizens as its
first priority.
Monday, 23 April 2012
Arab Spring Meeting Notes #3 - from Caracas to Cairo
This is the latest in my series of posts of notes from talks I have given at meetings here in Australia since my return from the middle east last year. This one was written immediately after I returned in December 2011 to a meeting of the Illawarra branch of the Socialist Alliance. There are some mistakes &or gaping holes in this one, which I've made it my mission to try and fill so that all of these posts can be developed some form of comprehensive article on the Arab Spring. So telling me I'm wrong, and especially pointing out how, would be much appreciated - as well as constructive criticism of any other sort. Feel free to plagarise all of these talks as much as you want, although read the aforementioned point about getting things wrong first! :p
The situation: A global economic crisis leading to spiralling prices of food and fuel, neoliberal reforms that pulled the support network out from underneath the people and pushed more and more below the poverty line – all at the behest of western institutions like the IMF and World Bank. A pro-western government responsible for torture, ill-treatment, extrajudicial killings, political disappearances and political corruption, happy to follow these mandates to the letter. The result: a mass uprising, brutally repressed by the regime with hundreds of deaths. This scenario could be used to describe the regimes of the Arab world and the overthrows of 2011, but it's equally describing the situation in Venezuela in 1989, when the Carazaco uprising took place, the regime suspended constitutional order, and anywhere between 500 and 2000 demonstrators were killed. Three years later, Lieutennant Colonel Hugo Chavez led an abortive coup attempt, and the following year President Perez was impeached by the Supreme Court. Why am I raising this in a talk on the Arab Spring? In many ways the example is a useful one to understand the process going on in Egypt, Tunisia & the broader middle-east right now. But I'll come to that later.
Background
When Mohammed Bouazizi doused himself with petrol in front of a police station on December 17, 2010, it was the final straw for many of those suffering under oppressive police states across the region. Decades of neoliberal economic reforms and spiralling oil prices since 2001 had been making life harder and harder for the vast majority living in the Arab world. This situation, this pressure, saw a variety of expressions over the first decade of this century. At first, this took forms which were relatively acceptable to the regimes – especially in Egypt, where solidarity mobilisations with the second Palestinian intifada in 2000-2001 and against the invasion of Iraq in 2003 brought street politics back to the region where it for the main part had been forced underground. These protests were the first for a new layer of young people who'd spent their whole lives living under the dictatorship.
However, when these young Egyptians and veteran leftists started campaigning for democratic reforms in 2004, forming the Egyptian movement for change (or "kefaya", enough), they began to face major harrasment from the regime. This came to a head in 2005, with the Mubarak regime organising a referendum approving constitutional changes allowing for multi-party elections while still ensuring the process was entirely sewn up by his National Democratic Party (NDP). Despite a strong grassroots campaign, Kefaya, as part of the National Front for Change coalition, only won 12 seats, with the NDP holding a super-majority of 388 seats and the Muslim Brotherhood winning 88. This reflected an important dynamic of this decade, which evolved out of imperialist interventions in the late 20th century; perhaps the majority of the population in most of the region, or at least a large section, saw political Islam, in one form or another, as the natural opposition to the pro-capitalist pro-Western pro-war on Terror regimes. Like the Venezuela comparison, we'll come back to this point; however, for now it's worth noting that, of all the region's countries, this support for political islam movements was perhaps weakest in Tunisia.
After this, and with the worsening of unemployment, poverty & other social conditions, a large layer of Arab youth & workers became increasingly radicalised. This came to a head in 2008, with radical workers in the key textile manufacturing city of Mahalla in Egypt leading a call for a general strike which for the first time articulated the demand for the revolutionary overthrow of the regime, as opposed to reforms or parliamentary change, and pitted the people against the state's apparatus of repression. Asides from poor pay and the corruption of the regime, basic economic issues – especially the major food shortage – were factors in this uprising; the little reportage it got in the Western media oversimplified this episode into a "bread riot", just one of many around the world occuring. In Tunisia, too, there were strikes and demonstrations by workers and the unemployed in the Gafsa mining region, which were likewise heavily repressed. These struggles gave birth to the revolutionary social movements which found their expression in what's been called the "Arab spring" – for example, Egypt's leading April 6 Youth Movement takes their name from the date of the 2008 Mahalla general strike. And they were also an important test of strength for the revolutionary workers movement, amongst which most of the underground leftists could be found.
So when Mohamed Bouazizi immolated himself on December 17, there was a huge layer of young Tunisians with whom this act resonated – who had all personally experienced the repression, corruption and harrasment of the regime's police officers, who had personally felt the desperation of being young, unemployed and with little hope for changing their situation, and who had seen how revolutionary action could hurt the regime. The final factor was the technological revolution which had seen cheap broadband internet and internet-ready mobile phones spread through the population in the course of little more than a year. The limited space for digital freedoms was taken up by citizen-journalist bloggers such as Lina Ben Mhenni, Slim Amamou and Azyz Amami. When protests broke out in Bouazizi's city of Sidi Bouzid (not Sidi Bou Said!), young people began posting videos of the spontaneous protests and the following repression on Facebook, and these three bloggers were crucial components, alongside the revolutionary workers, in growing this episode from just another chapter of repression to the point of nadir, the lowest point of the regime's excessed – the final straw.
Overthrowing the Dictators
So with the combination of these different factors, the Sidi Bouzid uprising spread like wildfire in a way the 2008 Gafsa protests had not been able to. And they brought a critical mass of people to the streets, shutting down the country until elements of the regime – including key military leaders – decided to cut their losses and temporarily side with the movement. This triggered Ben Ali's sudden departure – as documented by an air traffic controller at Tunis airport, part of the internet freedom movement, who tracked Ben Ali's plane as it attempted to land in France, the neo-colonial power with the biggest stakes in Tunisia's economy, before he was rejected and eventually fled to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, where he remains – hopefully to live out his days in the city as Idi Amin did!
This victory in Tunisia inspired many young Egyptians, who turned out in their thousands for the January 25 protest against police violence on national "police day". In the words of Basem Osman, a young member of the Socialist Party who I interviewed in Egypt: "Before January 25 I didn't think it would work – just like every other time, we would go, maybe 4-500 people, and the police will arrest a lot of us. But on this day, all of us were surprised – I thought I would go to Tahrir Square and just see my friends, but there were 3000 people in the square. It was the first time I'd seen a demonstration of that size! We didn't think it would continue, but at 1am the police attacked the demonstration, injured and arrested many of us, and the rest of us escaped. But when we fled, we didn't all go to our homes – most of us went to the poor neighbourhoods in Cairo like Abdeen, Shubra – very poor neighbourhoods – and when the police attacked again, many of my friends hid in the houses of ordinary people and told them about the demonstrations. I think this was as important as Facebook or Twitter in building the revolution. "
"I think that the Tunisian Revolution inspired people everywhere, gave people hope, and after that they were ready to demonstrate. Even my family, who normally didn't know anything about politics in Egypt, were asking me, "Are you going to the demonstrations on the 25th of January? We want to go."
The following days saw the Egyptian police respond with far greater savagery than their Tunisian counterparts did, and likewise, protests grew increasingly radical. Thus, on January 28, the first Friday of Anger, hundreds of thousands of protesters stormed and sacked the NDP headquarters. In Basim's words: "I don't believe in armed revolution, but the NDP headquarters is a huge building, which is very conspicuous; I see it every day when I go to work and so do many people, it's very central, and when we see it we feel so bad – it's a symbol of the regime. So when we saw it on 28 January, everyone just wanted to burn it."
I won't speak about the ins and outs of the following 18 days in Egypt; however, it's worth noting that the final blow to Mubarak's rule was not the inability or unwillingness of the military to carry out repression as the police were for fear of triggering a civil war, but the uprising of workers starting with the call for a general strike on February 6.
However, in both Tunisia and Egypt, the overthrow of the dictators themselves as well as their personal cronies who had personally profited from draining the nation's coffers – such as the Trabelsi family in Tunisia, who have fled the country one by one – has not translated into an end to neoliberal policies or breaking free of the imperialist enclosure. The regional political revolution against corrupt regimes has not yet been succesfully in fully removing them. Thus, we can compare the situation to the 1989 Carazaco uprising; the beginning of the ascendancy (potentially, anyway) of a revolutionary mass movement. As Hossam el-Hamalawy, blogger & member of the Revolutionary Socialists put it: "The Egyptian revolution will not be settled in 18 days or months. It’ll take “years” for the dust to settle, may be four or five, I don’t know. There will be waves, ebbs and flows, battles to be won and others lost."
The question, thus, is will these revolutions win their demands? That's the question I was asking myself when I went to Egypt in September; that's what I will now try to answer.
The Revolutionary Movements
Egypt
Arriving in Egypt the day before the September 9 protests that brought tens of thousands to Midan Tahrir, marching to the Ministry of Interior and the Supreme Court, and then thousands storming the Israeli embassy, certainly threw me in at the deep end! But arriving in Cairo at almost any point would have been like that.
After February 11, Friday protests -- in Cairo's Tahrir Square and nationwide -- continued more or less every week, with protesters reclaiming it for major sit-ins during July in the hundreds and then again in November in the thousands. These protests have also taken on the regime in more radical ways as the year has progressed; first over a guaranteed transition to civilian rule, then demanding the end to political repression, especially military trials for protesters, then after the October 9 massacre of dozens of Coptic Christians, openly calling forGeneral Tantawi, the head of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (the real power behind the throne; personally members control around 25% of the economy – us aid), to step down. #noscaf and #fuckscaf are the Twitter tags of this movement!
But even outside of what could be called the "democracy" movement of bloggers and activists, there has been mass democratic struggle in almost all layers of society, and the Tahrir protests are really only the tip of the iceberg. Most days when I walk around the city or meet various people there are little sit-ins or protests or speakouts happening outside ministries or public buildings. More than once I was simply spending time in my room and saw protesters marching past from my balcony that I had heard nothing about!
New workers' movement
The lion's share of these protests are by parts of the new workers' movement, which, as I outlined, were growing for several years before 2011. The official trade unions and syndicates, more than 4000 in total, were sewn up by the NDP, but in the last few years underground independent unions have been forming out of wildcat struggles within Egypt's major factories and businesses. Now there's more than 150 independent unions, and more are being established all the time; some of these unions have won official recognition, and are leading struggles – both for economic demands like better pay and conditions, but also for structural reforms, to get rid of Mubarak's cronies and for more worker control of workplaces.
For example, one protest march I saw was by secondary school teachers, who are striking for better pay, demanding the removal of the minister and more funding for public education – a major issue, as all Egyptian families have to shell out for either private schooling or extra tuition due to the inadequacy of the state schools. These protests broke out into a close to general strike in October, just one example of the many sectors of the economy where strikes & labor activity have occured. The Egyptian Socialist Party and other revolutionary socialists have prioritised working in this area, which is one of the reasons why it's been growing so successfully.
Cronies
The key figureheads of the old regime are imprisoned or on trial in absentia, but in pretty much every big business, ministry or government department and public service – Mubarak-era cronies are still in power, and the networks of corruption still exist. The repression of protest and activism may have eased up since February 11, but corruption – such as the bribes to get things done in the system – have worsened. And in some ways, such as the military trials – which have imprisoned over 12,000 activists, and sentenced 8000, as well as subjecting all female protesters to "virginity tests" – are worse than anything carried out under Mubarak.
On this basis, it's clear to most Egyptians that the revolution hasn't changed much yet, but the revolutionary movement still seems to have the support of most people on the street. The trade union movement is a big part of this – revolutionaries aren't just talking about the nebulous structure of the whole political class, or rights and class in an abstract way, but also conducting campaigns against specific individual figures at all levels of power, who ordinary people know are corrupt and are stooges of the rich and the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (which, thanks to years of billion-dollar blank cheques from the US, owns of huge swathes of industry).
The Elections
The most recent occupation of Tahrir has largely petered out in recent days, especially given that the expected suspension of November 28's elections never materialised. Mostafa Ali, of Egypt's Revolutionary Socialists, has said:
While the RS are in some ways taking an ultra-left line on the struggle, this assessment is spot-on.
Most Egyptians are willing to put their faith in Ikhwan, in the parliament, and in SCAF's administration of the transition; they know that, if these is outright manipulation or a backwards step by the government, they have the power to get rid of them. But this is a dangerous situation, as the military regime has signalled its intent to enshrine its power under the new parliament & president, ensuring that its budget and authority will not be under civilian mandate or scrutiny. The coming period is a test for the revolutionary movement, and calls for a display of leadership to take this fight to the new parliament and SCAF and expose them as stooges of imperialism with no desire to break from the neoliberal consensus.
Revolutionary left
Meeting with comrades of the Egyptian Socialist Party (a socialist unity project which seems like the closest thing here to Germany's Die Linke or Australia's Socialist Alliance) was really illuminating, especially for putting the particular struggles in context and finding out more about what's been going on with the independent trade union movement.
Key leaders of the democracy movement are also affiliated to one or another of the socialist parties which have formed post-February 11; the Revolutionary Socialists have been joined by several of the leading blogger/democracy activists, while the Egyptian Socialist Party, for example, has joined by many of the leaders of the Kefaya movement.
Another aspect has been pro-poor work on a more direct level; revolutionary youth have been going into poorer communities, especially the informal slum settlements on the edge of Cairo, and helping to establish committees and networks simply to fight for access to basic infrastructure, jobs, food, etc. This is very exciting; there's a big layer of revolutionary "Tahrir" youth who are joining the organised left now that it's out from underground and openly propagandising.
While I was meeting with a comrade at the downtown Cairo office of the Egyptian Socialist Party, there was a meeting of around 20 young members, some with pre-January experience in politics but most without, debating the best ways to take the revolution forward. It was certainly a world away from some of the sleepy education meetings I've been part of in Australia! Many of the "Tahrir" youth can tend towards an ultraleft emphasis on protest, occupation and confronting the state – to what extent to embrace this tendency instead of emphasising the many kinds of party-building and activism needed to grow the movement has been something of a debate among the left here.
The revolutionary left in Egypt is well aware of the need to keep this struggle growing; to strengthen the parties and forces of the left so they can lead the struggle is everyone's primary task – while at the same time doing as much as possible to work towards unity, such as opening joint party offices in smaller cities where the left was unable to organise during the underground Mubarak years. However, over the elections, there have been some significant splits; the ESP and some other revolutionary groups, including a split of radical youth from the Muslim Brotherhood, still contested the elections, while the RS and some of the other Tahrir protesters called for a boycott, which basically failed.
Tunisia
Travelling to Tunisia was a bit of a shock after the turbulent revolutionary spirit of Cairo. When I first arrived, I was especially shocked by the fact that Avenue Habib Bourguiba and the Kasbah square (the two sites of major protest in the capital Tunis) are under occupation by the police, with razor wire set up outside the prime minister's office, the Ministry of Interior, the French embassy and pretty much anywhere that people will specifically protest against. The army is on the streets too; I've got no idea if they still have a pro-revolutionary image here, despite its US funding, but it is much smaller than the police forces. Either way, the streets are definitely under wraps at present, and mass struggle has been much more successfully contained.
Mass protests and strikes definitely slowed down in Tunisia, at least in the major urban centres of the coast, over the course of the constituent assembly elections, which took place on October 23. The assembly brought the islamist Ennahda (rennaisance) to power, although only with 37% of the vote. This timetable is designed, as far as I can tell, to tread the line between reining in the revolutionary energy of Tunisia's youth and winning enough legitimacy among the majority of the population to avoid a "second revolution" protest wave breaking out. However, Tunisia's revolutionary movement has seen a resurgence post-elections, with a wave of labor activism including strikes & an unemployed movement occupying for more jobs for local communities starting in the final days of October, as well as mass demonstrations in Tunis outside the new parliament.
But the Tunisian revolutionary struggle wasn't ended, despite the election sucking up the energy of a good number of democracy activists and the organised left. Like in Egypt, there are struggles within every element of society to get rid of corrupt figures from the old regime. For example, on my second day in Tunis I saw two protests: one, a group of around 650 graduate secondary teachers staging a sit-in at the Ministry of Education to demand the government create jobs for them, I saw on my way walking to another demanding the release of a police officer whistleblower who revealed that two recently appointed figures were corrupt and were responsible for killing protesters.
Tunisian left
One factor that made a difference in Tunisia's revolution beginning first was the difference in unionism; unlike in Egypt, where the state unions and syndicates were quite tightly controlled, leftists were able to hide under the umbrella of the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT, Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail) at the local branch level under Ben Ali dictatorship, although the top leadership was bought off by the regime. The UGTT was one of the key bodies, along with the blogger-journalist-activists, in spreading the uprising from the rural town of Sidi Bouzid, to the bigger cities along the coast, due to the slightly greater leeway for activity at the local branch level.
There have been some initiatives to set up independent trade unions, including by the police, which have been quashed by the regime; I'm yet to hear of any purging of the UGTT of Ben Ali collaborators, but I really don't know what the state of play is there or whether the UGTT remains a functional body actually leading the workers' movement. I know that a conference is taking place in December for revolutionary unionists to discuss how to help grow the movement, so stay posted on that one.
One exception worth mentioning is the national union of students; it had some leeway to struggle under the first post-colonial dictator Bourguiba, but was totally infiltrated by Ben Ali and became totally useless. Since January 14 it's been reclaimed and is leading struggles on campuses, over basic things like money for textbooks or students unfairly dismissed by the corrupt administrations still in place at most universities.
Due to the closeness of the relationship with France, many exiled left organisations organised among the diaspora in France for the last 10 or 20 years and have now returned; some of the more radical of the centre-left formations, which look likely to do well in the elections, such as Ettakatol (Democratic Forum for Labour and Freedoms), are in this category. Revolutionary groups have returned since Ben Ali's downfall. The Left Worker's League (LGO), the main Trotskyist group, seems to fall into this category; most of the democracy activists and young people I've spoken to here don't even know who they are, and I haven't been able to get in touch with them or meet them yet.
Communist Workers' Party of Tunisia
I did manage, however, to meet with a member of the central committee of the Communist Workers' Party of Tunisia (PCOT), which played an essential role in the uprising against Ben Ali (largely through their involvement in the UGTT) and who seem to be the biggest and best force on the left here. Despite their affiliation to the Hoxhaist (Albanian Maoist) international tendency, they have the sharpest line on the ongoing revolution and how to keep advancing the struggle of anybody that I've spoken to here. It is definitely the only big-name party in Tunisia that didn't switch to safe rhetoric due to the approaching election, and it is still talking about revolution!
The biggest weakness that I'd identify of the PCOT is that it isn't as well respected among democracy activists, or as big a part of that movement as, for example, the revolutionary socialists in Egypt are. Indeed, many of the leading blogger-journalist-activists here, such as Slim Amamou (who was named the minister of youth within the second post-January 14 government, although he recently resigned that post) and Azyz Amami, are leaders of the Tunisian Pirate Party, which seems to be taking on the role of groups like April 6 or the Coalition of Revolutionary Youth in Egypt. And still more are standing for election as independant candidates.
The PCOT is a very old party, which struggled underground for a long time, which means it is well positioned to organise for the elections – this, I think, may have deterred people who are rightly cynical of the electoral process. However, revolutionary young people are definitely looking to the organised left, and to the PCOT especially (the local "goth" subculture in Tunis, for example, is full of PCOT militants!). The PCOT's main office in Tunis was absolutely bustling with young people doing various things for the election campaign.
And post-election campaign, PCOT has played a massive role in leading the resurgence of revolutionary struggle; their activists were central to organising Tunisia's #occupy protests on 11th November, as well as the ongoing Bardo sit-in outside the parliament building where the new Constituent Assembly, demanding that the new constitution be put to a referendum, the prosecution of police officers responsible for killings during the uprising against Ben Ali, suspending international debt repayments incurred by Ben Ali's regime, and community democracy reforms very similar to Community Voice's platform! Live broadcast of assembly sessions, etc.
So – will these struggles win? I've tried to paint as accurate a picture I can of these movements, their strengths and weaknesses, and their sway in the population as a whole. The struggle may take years, and it may never bring revolutionary parliaments or governments like Chavez. Each revolutionary process has to confront and break down the power of the state in its own way. But I am optimistic and confident that yes, these movements will win.
The situation: A global economic crisis leading to spiralling prices of food and fuel, neoliberal reforms that pulled the support network out from underneath the people and pushed more and more below the poverty line – all at the behest of western institutions like the IMF and World Bank. A pro-western government responsible for torture, ill-treatment, extrajudicial killings, political disappearances and political corruption, happy to follow these mandates to the letter. The result: a mass uprising, brutally repressed by the regime with hundreds of deaths. This scenario could be used to describe the regimes of the Arab world and the overthrows of 2011, but it's equally describing the situation in Venezuela in 1989, when the Carazaco uprising took place, the regime suspended constitutional order, and anywhere between 500 and 2000 demonstrators were killed. Three years later, Lieutennant Colonel Hugo Chavez led an abortive coup attempt, and the following year President Perez was impeached by the Supreme Court. Why am I raising this in a talk on the Arab Spring? In many ways the example is a useful one to understand the process going on in Egypt, Tunisia & the broader middle-east right now. But I'll come to that later.
Background
When Mohammed Bouazizi doused himself with petrol in front of a police station on December 17, 2010, it was the final straw for many of those suffering under oppressive police states across the region. Decades of neoliberal economic reforms and spiralling oil prices since 2001 had been making life harder and harder for the vast majority living in the Arab world. This situation, this pressure, saw a variety of expressions over the first decade of this century. At first, this took forms which were relatively acceptable to the regimes – especially in Egypt, where solidarity mobilisations with the second Palestinian intifada in 2000-2001 and against the invasion of Iraq in 2003 brought street politics back to the region where it for the main part had been forced underground. These protests were the first for a new layer of young people who'd spent their whole lives living under the dictatorship.
However, when these young Egyptians and veteran leftists started campaigning for democratic reforms in 2004, forming the Egyptian movement for change (or "kefaya", enough), they began to face major harrasment from the regime. This came to a head in 2005, with the Mubarak regime organising a referendum approving constitutional changes allowing for multi-party elections while still ensuring the process was entirely sewn up by his National Democratic Party (NDP). Despite a strong grassroots campaign, Kefaya, as part of the National Front for Change coalition, only won 12 seats, with the NDP holding a super-majority of 388 seats and the Muslim Brotherhood winning 88. This reflected an important dynamic of this decade, which evolved out of imperialist interventions in the late 20th century; perhaps the majority of the population in most of the region, or at least a large section, saw political Islam, in one form or another, as the natural opposition to the pro-capitalist pro-Western pro-war on Terror regimes. Like the Venezuela comparison, we'll come back to this point; however, for now it's worth noting that, of all the region's countries, this support for political islam movements was perhaps weakest in Tunisia.
After this, and with the worsening of unemployment, poverty & other social conditions, a large layer of Arab youth & workers became increasingly radicalised. This came to a head in 2008, with radical workers in the key textile manufacturing city of Mahalla in Egypt leading a call for a general strike which for the first time articulated the demand for the revolutionary overthrow of the regime, as opposed to reforms or parliamentary change, and pitted the people against the state's apparatus of repression. Asides from poor pay and the corruption of the regime, basic economic issues – especially the major food shortage – were factors in this uprising; the little reportage it got in the Western media oversimplified this episode into a "bread riot", just one of many around the world occuring. In Tunisia, too, there were strikes and demonstrations by workers and the unemployed in the Gafsa mining region, which were likewise heavily repressed. These struggles gave birth to the revolutionary social movements which found their expression in what's been called the "Arab spring" – for example, Egypt's leading April 6 Youth Movement takes their name from the date of the 2008 Mahalla general strike. And they were also an important test of strength for the revolutionary workers movement, amongst which most of the underground leftists could be found.
So when Mohamed Bouazizi immolated himself on December 17, there was a huge layer of young Tunisians with whom this act resonated – who had all personally experienced the repression, corruption and harrasment of the regime's police officers, who had personally felt the desperation of being young, unemployed and with little hope for changing their situation, and who had seen how revolutionary action could hurt the regime. The final factor was the technological revolution which had seen cheap broadband internet and internet-ready mobile phones spread through the population in the course of little more than a year. The limited space for digital freedoms was taken up by citizen-journalist bloggers such as Lina Ben Mhenni, Slim Amamou and Azyz Amami. When protests broke out in Bouazizi's city of Sidi Bouzid (not Sidi Bou Said!), young people began posting videos of the spontaneous protests and the following repression on Facebook, and these three bloggers were crucial components, alongside the revolutionary workers, in growing this episode from just another chapter of repression to the point of nadir, the lowest point of the regime's excessed – the final straw.
Overthrowing the Dictators
So with the combination of these different factors, the Sidi Bouzid uprising spread like wildfire in a way the 2008 Gafsa protests had not been able to. And they brought a critical mass of people to the streets, shutting down the country until elements of the regime – including key military leaders – decided to cut their losses and temporarily side with the movement. This triggered Ben Ali's sudden departure – as documented by an air traffic controller at Tunis airport, part of the internet freedom movement, who tracked Ben Ali's plane as it attempted to land in France, the neo-colonial power with the biggest stakes in Tunisia's economy, before he was rejected and eventually fled to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, where he remains – hopefully to live out his days in the city as Idi Amin did!
This victory in Tunisia inspired many young Egyptians, who turned out in their thousands for the January 25 protest against police violence on national "police day". In the words of Basem Osman, a young member of the Socialist Party who I interviewed in Egypt: "Before January 25 I didn't think it would work – just like every other time, we would go, maybe 4-500 people, and the police will arrest a lot of us. But on this day, all of us were surprised – I thought I would go to Tahrir Square and just see my friends, but there were 3000 people in the square. It was the first time I'd seen a demonstration of that size! We didn't think it would continue, but at 1am the police attacked the demonstration, injured and arrested many of us, and the rest of us escaped. But when we fled, we didn't all go to our homes – most of us went to the poor neighbourhoods in Cairo like Abdeen, Shubra – very poor neighbourhoods – and when the police attacked again, many of my friends hid in the houses of ordinary people and told them about the demonstrations. I think this was as important as Facebook or Twitter in building the revolution. "
"I think that the Tunisian Revolution inspired people everywhere, gave people hope, and after that they were ready to demonstrate. Even my family, who normally didn't know anything about politics in Egypt, were asking me, "Are you going to the demonstrations on the 25th of January? We want to go."
The following days saw the Egyptian police respond with far greater savagery than their Tunisian counterparts did, and likewise, protests grew increasingly radical. Thus, on January 28, the first Friday of Anger, hundreds of thousands of protesters stormed and sacked the NDP headquarters. In Basim's words: "I don't believe in armed revolution, but the NDP headquarters is a huge building, which is very conspicuous; I see it every day when I go to work and so do many people, it's very central, and when we see it we feel so bad – it's a symbol of the regime. So when we saw it on 28 January, everyone just wanted to burn it."
I won't speak about the ins and outs of the following 18 days in Egypt; however, it's worth noting that the final blow to Mubarak's rule was not the inability or unwillingness of the military to carry out repression as the police were for fear of triggering a civil war, but the uprising of workers starting with the call for a general strike on February 6.
However, in both Tunisia and Egypt, the overthrow of the dictators themselves as well as their personal cronies who had personally profited from draining the nation's coffers – such as the Trabelsi family in Tunisia, who have fled the country one by one – has not translated into an end to neoliberal policies or breaking free of the imperialist enclosure. The regional political revolution against corrupt regimes has not yet been succesfully in fully removing them. Thus, we can compare the situation to the 1989 Carazaco uprising; the beginning of the ascendancy (potentially, anyway) of a revolutionary mass movement. As Hossam el-Hamalawy, blogger & member of the Revolutionary Socialists put it: "The Egyptian revolution will not be settled in 18 days or months. It’ll take “years” for the dust to settle, may be four or five, I don’t know. There will be waves, ebbs and flows, battles to be won and others lost."
The question, thus, is will these revolutions win their demands? That's the question I was asking myself when I went to Egypt in September; that's what I will now try to answer.
The Revolutionary Movements
Egypt
Arriving in Egypt the day before the September 9 protests that brought tens of thousands to Midan Tahrir, marching to the Ministry of Interior and the Supreme Court, and then thousands storming the Israeli embassy, certainly threw me in at the deep end! But arriving in Cairo at almost any point would have been like that.
After February 11, Friday protests -- in Cairo's Tahrir Square and nationwide -- continued more or less every week, with protesters reclaiming it for major sit-ins during July in the hundreds and then again in November in the thousands. These protests have also taken on the regime in more radical ways as the year has progressed; first over a guaranteed transition to civilian rule, then demanding the end to political repression, especially military trials for protesters, then after the October 9 massacre of dozens of Coptic Christians, openly calling forGeneral Tantawi, the head of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (the real power behind the throne; personally members control around 25% of the economy – us aid), to step down. #noscaf and #fuckscaf are the Twitter tags of this movement!
But even outside of what could be called the "democracy" movement of bloggers and activists, there has been mass democratic struggle in almost all layers of society, and the Tahrir protests are really only the tip of the iceberg. Most days when I walk around the city or meet various people there are little sit-ins or protests or speakouts happening outside ministries or public buildings. More than once I was simply spending time in my room and saw protesters marching past from my balcony that I had heard nothing about!
New workers' movement
The lion's share of these protests are by parts of the new workers' movement, which, as I outlined, were growing for several years before 2011. The official trade unions and syndicates, more than 4000 in total, were sewn up by the NDP, but in the last few years underground independent unions have been forming out of wildcat struggles within Egypt's major factories and businesses. Now there's more than 150 independent unions, and more are being established all the time; some of these unions have won official recognition, and are leading struggles – both for economic demands like better pay and conditions, but also for structural reforms, to get rid of Mubarak's cronies and for more worker control of workplaces.
For example, one protest march I saw was by secondary school teachers, who are striking for better pay, demanding the removal of the minister and more funding for public education – a major issue, as all Egyptian families have to shell out for either private schooling or extra tuition due to the inadequacy of the state schools. These protests broke out into a close to general strike in October, just one example of the many sectors of the economy where strikes & labor activity have occured. The Egyptian Socialist Party and other revolutionary socialists have prioritised working in this area, which is one of the reasons why it's been growing so successfully.
Cronies
The key figureheads of the old regime are imprisoned or on trial in absentia, but in pretty much every big business, ministry or government department and public service – Mubarak-era cronies are still in power, and the networks of corruption still exist. The repression of protest and activism may have eased up since February 11, but corruption – such as the bribes to get things done in the system – have worsened. And in some ways, such as the military trials – which have imprisoned over 12,000 activists, and sentenced 8000, as well as subjecting all female protesters to "virginity tests" – are worse than anything carried out under Mubarak.
On this basis, it's clear to most Egyptians that the revolution hasn't changed much yet, but the revolutionary movement still seems to have the support of most people on the street. The trade union movement is a big part of this – revolutionaries aren't just talking about the nebulous structure of the whole political class, or rights and class in an abstract way, but also conducting campaigns against specific individual figures at all levels of power, who ordinary people know are corrupt and are stooges of the rich and the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (which, thanks to years of billion-dollar blank cheques from the US, owns of huge swathes of industry).
The Elections
The most recent occupation of Tahrir has largely petered out in recent days, especially given that the expected suspension of November 28's elections never materialised. Mostafa Ali, of Egypt's Revolutionary Socialists, has said:
"THE political sentiment in Tahrir is ahead of the country. You can think of it as the revolutionary vanguard in society among students and workers and youth--but it is much larger than in January. Political consciousness has developed tremendously.
These are people who understand that the SCAF is the continuation of the Mubarak regime. They are beginning to understand the connection between political and economic issues. They are beginning to grapple with the role of police in society. And they are the ones who understand that the ruling class played a trick on them by using Mubarak as a scapegoat in order to save the rest of the political system.
So you have a minority in society--symbolized by Tahrir--which has advanced politically and in terms of its consciousness. And it's ahead of the rest of the country in that sense. Back in January, a majority of people in the country wanted Mubarak to go, so they supported Tahrir. At this moment, that isn't the case regarding the SCAF.
The revolutionary vanguard is much, much larger. Its willingness to fight is unbelievable--it fought five days against the police. But the majority of the workers and poor people have not yet concluded that the SCAF must immediately return to its barracks. Or they don't think we have the power yet to push the SCAF to return the barracks."
While the RS are in some ways taking an ultra-left line on the struggle, this assessment is spot-on.
Most Egyptians are willing to put their faith in Ikhwan, in the parliament, and in SCAF's administration of the transition; they know that, if these is outright manipulation or a backwards step by the government, they have the power to get rid of them. But this is a dangerous situation, as the military regime has signalled its intent to enshrine its power under the new parliament & president, ensuring that its budget and authority will not be under civilian mandate or scrutiny. The coming period is a test for the revolutionary movement, and calls for a display of leadership to take this fight to the new parliament and SCAF and expose them as stooges of imperialism with no desire to break from the neoliberal consensus.
Revolutionary left
Meeting with comrades of the Egyptian Socialist Party (a socialist unity project which seems like the closest thing here to Germany's Die Linke or Australia's Socialist Alliance) was really illuminating, especially for putting the particular struggles in context and finding out more about what's been going on with the independent trade union movement.
Key leaders of the democracy movement are also affiliated to one or another of the socialist parties which have formed post-February 11; the Revolutionary Socialists have been joined by several of the leading blogger/democracy activists, while the Egyptian Socialist Party, for example, has joined by many of the leaders of the Kefaya movement.
Another aspect has been pro-poor work on a more direct level; revolutionary youth have been going into poorer communities, especially the informal slum settlements on the edge of Cairo, and helping to establish committees and networks simply to fight for access to basic infrastructure, jobs, food, etc. This is very exciting; there's a big layer of revolutionary "Tahrir" youth who are joining the organised left now that it's out from underground and openly propagandising.
While I was meeting with a comrade at the downtown Cairo office of the Egyptian Socialist Party, there was a meeting of around 20 young members, some with pre-January experience in politics but most without, debating the best ways to take the revolution forward. It was certainly a world away from some of the sleepy education meetings I've been part of in Australia! Many of the "Tahrir" youth can tend towards an ultraleft emphasis on protest, occupation and confronting the state – to what extent to embrace this tendency instead of emphasising the many kinds of party-building and activism needed to grow the movement has been something of a debate among the left here.
The revolutionary left in Egypt is well aware of the need to keep this struggle growing; to strengthen the parties and forces of the left so they can lead the struggle is everyone's primary task – while at the same time doing as much as possible to work towards unity, such as opening joint party offices in smaller cities where the left was unable to organise during the underground Mubarak years. However, over the elections, there have been some significant splits; the ESP and some other revolutionary groups, including a split of radical youth from the Muslim Brotherhood, still contested the elections, while the RS and some of the other Tahrir protesters called for a boycott, which basically failed.
Tunisia
Travelling to Tunisia was a bit of a shock after the turbulent revolutionary spirit of Cairo. When I first arrived, I was especially shocked by the fact that Avenue Habib Bourguiba and the Kasbah square (the two sites of major protest in the capital Tunis) are under occupation by the police, with razor wire set up outside the prime minister's office, the Ministry of Interior, the French embassy and pretty much anywhere that people will specifically protest against. The army is on the streets too; I've got no idea if they still have a pro-revolutionary image here, despite its US funding, but it is much smaller than the police forces. Either way, the streets are definitely under wraps at present, and mass struggle has been much more successfully contained.
Mass protests and strikes definitely slowed down in Tunisia, at least in the major urban centres of the coast, over the course of the constituent assembly elections, which took place on October 23. The assembly brought the islamist Ennahda (rennaisance) to power, although only with 37% of the vote. This timetable is designed, as far as I can tell, to tread the line between reining in the revolutionary energy of Tunisia's youth and winning enough legitimacy among the majority of the population to avoid a "second revolution" protest wave breaking out. However, Tunisia's revolutionary movement has seen a resurgence post-elections, with a wave of labor activism including strikes & an unemployed movement occupying for more jobs for local communities starting in the final days of October, as well as mass demonstrations in Tunis outside the new parliament.
But the Tunisian revolutionary struggle wasn't ended, despite the election sucking up the energy of a good number of democracy activists and the organised left. Like in Egypt, there are struggles within every element of society to get rid of corrupt figures from the old regime. For example, on my second day in Tunis I saw two protests: one, a group of around 650 graduate secondary teachers staging a sit-in at the Ministry of Education to demand the government create jobs for them, I saw on my way walking to another demanding the release of a police officer whistleblower who revealed that two recently appointed figures were corrupt and were responsible for killing protesters.
Tunisian left
One factor that made a difference in Tunisia's revolution beginning first was the difference in unionism; unlike in Egypt, where the state unions and syndicates were quite tightly controlled, leftists were able to hide under the umbrella of the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT, Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail) at the local branch level under Ben Ali dictatorship, although the top leadership was bought off by the regime. The UGTT was one of the key bodies, along with the blogger-journalist-activists, in spreading the uprising from the rural town of Sidi Bouzid, to the bigger cities along the coast, due to the slightly greater leeway for activity at the local branch level.
There have been some initiatives to set up independent trade unions, including by the police, which have been quashed by the regime; I'm yet to hear of any purging of the UGTT of Ben Ali collaborators, but I really don't know what the state of play is there or whether the UGTT remains a functional body actually leading the workers' movement. I know that a conference is taking place in December for revolutionary unionists to discuss how to help grow the movement, so stay posted on that one.
One exception worth mentioning is the national union of students; it had some leeway to struggle under the first post-colonial dictator Bourguiba, but was totally infiltrated by Ben Ali and became totally useless. Since January 14 it's been reclaimed and is leading struggles on campuses, over basic things like money for textbooks or students unfairly dismissed by the corrupt administrations still in place at most universities.
Due to the closeness of the relationship with France, many exiled left organisations organised among the diaspora in France for the last 10 or 20 years and have now returned; some of the more radical of the centre-left formations, which look likely to do well in the elections, such as Ettakatol (Democratic Forum for Labour and Freedoms), are in this category. Revolutionary groups have returned since Ben Ali's downfall. The Left Worker's League (LGO), the main Trotskyist group, seems to fall into this category; most of the democracy activists and young people I've spoken to here don't even know who they are, and I haven't been able to get in touch with them or meet them yet.
Communist Workers' Party of Tunisia
I did manage, however, to meet with a member of the central committee of the Communist Workers' Party of Tunisia (PCOT), which played an essential role in the uprising against Ben Ali (largely through their involvement in the UGTT) and who seem to be the biggest and best force on the left here. Despite their affiliation to the Hoxhaist (Albanian Maoist) international tendency, they have the sharpest line on the ongoing revolution and how to keep advancing the struggle of anybody that I've spoken to here. It is definitely the only big-name party in Tunisia that didn't switch to safe rhetoric due to the approaching election, and it is still talking about revolution!
The biggest weakness that I'd identify of the PCOT is that it isn't as well respected among democracy activists, or as big a part of that movement as, for example, the revolutionary socialists in Egypt are. Indeed, many of the leading blogger-journalist-activists here, such as Slim Amamou (who was named the minister of youth within the second post-January 14 government, although he recently resigned that post) and Azyz Amami, are leaders of the Tunisian Pirate Party, which seems to be taking on the role of groups like April 6 or the Coalition of Revolutionary Youth in Egypt. And still more are standing for election as independant candidates.
The PCOT is a very old party, which struggled underground for a long time, which means it is well positioned to organise for the elections – this, I think, may have deterred people who are rightly cynical of the electoral process. However, revolutionary young people are definitely looking to the organised left, and to the PCOT especially (the local "goth" subculture in Tunis, for example, is full of PCOT militants!). The PCOT's main office in Tunis was absolutely bustling with young people doing various things for the election campaign.
And post-election campaign, PCOT has played a massive role in leading the resurgence of revolutionary struggle; their activists were central to organising Tunisia's #occupy protests on 11th November, as well as the ongoing Bardo sit-in outside the parliament building where the new Constituent Assembly, demanding that the new constitution be put to a referendum, the prosecution of police officers responsible for killings during the uprising against Ben Ali, suspending international debt repayments incurred by Ben Ali's regime, and community democracy reforms very similar to Community Voice's platform! Live broadcast of assembly sessions, etc.
So – will these struggles win? I've tried to paint as accurate a picture I can of these movements, their strengths and weaknesses, and their sway in the population as a whole. The struggle may take years, and it may never bring revolutionary parliaments or governments like Chavez. Each revolutionary process has to confront and break down the power of the state in its own way. But I am optimistic and confident that yes, these movements will win.
Sunday, 23 October 2011
Egypt: Fresh protests to demand real change
Tens of thousands of Egyptians reclaimed Tahrir square from police on September 9, demanding an end to military trials of civilians and for judicial freedom.
Security forces withdrew from the square on the day before. It had been under guard since a sit-in was broken up on August 1.
Groups of youth immediately started organising the September 9 rally. They marched through the streets of downtown Cairo demanding an end to the rule of the military council and calling for Cairo's residents to join the protest.
Hundreds of youth were still in the square in the early morning of September 9, debating Egyptian politics. Marches from across Cairo began flooding into Tahrir Square hours before the publicised start time.
As Friday prayers came to an end, thousands more filled the square, including fans of the Ahly and Zamalek football clubs.
The two groups of supporters, ordinarily rivals, led many of the protest's chants together.
About 100 members of the Independent Farmers’ Union also took part. They demanded an end to corruption within the Ministry of Agriculture, the secretary general of the union’s Giza branch, Misbah Asaker, was reported as saying by Al Masry Al Youm.
At about 4pm, protesters began marching out of the square to other sites in the thousands.
Groups marched on the interior ministry and the Supreme Court. They demanded an end to police repression and that those guilty of killing protesters be brought to justice.
Thousands of protesters also marched on the Israeli embassy, using ropes and hammers to tear down a concrete wall assembled the week before to prevent demonstrations.
During the night, protesters broke into the embassy and threw documents into the street, triggering clashes with the notorious Central Security Forces riot police that left three people dead.
The Israeli ambassador and embassy staff had fled Egypt by early morning.
The protests have been named the demonstrations, "Friday of correcting the course of the revolution". Most of the demands centred around fulfilling key goals of the January uprising which overthrew Hosni Mubarak, including democratic and economic freedoms.
However, the Israeli attack on Sinai in August that killed five Egyptian soldiers, as well as Israel's ongoing bombardment and repression of Gaza, has brought Egypt's role in the broader middle-east to the forefront.
The gap between the Egyptian government's attitude towards Israel — one of maintaining the allegiance held by Mubarak's regime — and that of the Egyptian people, was clearly expressed by the government's refusal to expel Israel's ambassador in response to the Sinai bombings.
Now, however, the Egyptian people have taken their relationship with Israel into their own hands.
The Cairo protests were just one aspect of the ongoing revolutionary struggle in Egypt. Another coming to a head in recent weeks is radical trade union organisation, independent of the bureaucratic structures formerly controlled by Mubarak's regime.
Textile workers in one factory of the industrial city of Mahalla — an epicentre of workers' struggle in the last four years — called off a strike planned for September 10 after the government agreed to their demands. They won increased pay and organising new elections for factory management, Daily News Egypt said.
However, workers in three other factories in Mahalla, and others around the country, have threatened to join the strike until they win the same demands.
Medical workers also staged protests on September 10. Teachers, for their part, assembled in downtown Cairo to call for an open ended strike, which threatens to disrupt the new school year on September 17.
Teacher Khaled Assawy told Ahram Online: "We are not afraid of the threats that we have been hearing from the government this whole week. We know what we want and we will fight for it."
The teachers’ demands include salary raises and improvements in benefits, decent training and permanent employment for thousands of teachers on short-term contracts. They also call for the resignation of education minister Ahmed Moussa.
From GLW issue 895
View original post here: http://www.greenleft.org.au/node/48818
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